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exclusive pleading rule by cit-
ing a decision which held that 
an insured receives the benefit 
of the doubt when potential cov-
erage is uncertain from the alle-
gations in the complaint. Id. at 
107,651 A.2d at 863-64 (citing 
US.F & G. v. Nat. Pav. Co., 
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872 
(1962)). The exclusive plead-
ing rule, the court opined, can 
often deprive the insured of the 
benefit of his bargain in an in-
surance contract by permitting 
the insurer to look exclusively 
at the complaint and ignore val-
id defenses to avoid coverage. 
Id. at 110-11,651 A.2d at 865. 
The court noted an ex-
ception for frivolous defenses 
Curry v. Hillcrest 
Clinic, Inc.: 














made by the insured solely to 
establish an insurer's duty to 
defend. Id. at 111-12,651 A.2d 
at 866. In combatting potential 
abuse, the court limited an in-
sured's use of extrinsic evidence 
to establish a potentiality of 
coverage to situations where 
the insured can demonstrate a 
"reasonable potential that the 
issue triggering coverage will 
be generated at trial." Id. at 
112, 651 A.2d at 866. Because 
Cochran had presented corrob-
orating testimony and other 
evidence supporting the poten-
tiality of coverage, the court 
found that Cochran's claim of 
self-defense was not frivolous. 
Id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866. 
In Curry v. Hillcrest 
Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 653 
A.2d 934 (1995), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that 
where a common basis of lia-
bility is alleged against co-de-
fendants, one of whom has been 
found in default, a finding in 
favor ofthe non-defaulting co-
defendant automatically inures 
to the benefit of the defaulting 
co-defendant. In such cases, 
despite an original order of de-
fault, damages cannot be as-
sessed against the defaulting 
co-defendant. Consequently, 
the order in default must be 
stricken. This holding signi-
fied the court of appeal's rec-
ognition, affirmance, and con-
tinued acceptance of the Frow 
, 
-~------ --------
Aetna Casualty & Sure-
ty Company v. Cochran clearly 
reinforces the public policy con-
cern that insurance policy hold-
ers should not be unreasonably 
precluded from receiving the 
coverage bargained for in their 
insurance contracts. The court's 
holding will make it consider-
ably more difficult for insurers 
to avoid their obligations to de-
fend insureds, while simulta-
neously providing a safeguard 
against frivolous claims of po-
tential coverage. 
- Jeffrey A. Friedman 
doctrine, first enunciated in the 
United States Supreme Court 
decision Frow v. De La Vega, 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872). 
Curry involved a mal-
practice claim filed with the 
Health Claims Arbitration Of-
fice (HCAO) alleging the neg-
ligence and liability of Dr. 
Sharma and the liability of 
Hillcrest Clinic (Hillcrest), 
Sharma's employer, under the 
doctrine of respondeat superi-
or. Hillcrest failed to answer 
Curry's complaint, and an or-
der of default was entered by 
the HCAO Director against 
Hillcrest stating that the amount 
of damages owed by Hillcrest 
was to be determined by the 
HCAO arbitration panel. 
The arbitration panel 
held a hearing on the issue of 
Sharma's liability to Curry at 
which time Hillcrest was only 
permitted to participate with 
respect to the amount of dam-
ages. After the hearing, the 
panel found that although 
Sharma's actions in the matter 
constituted negligence, such 
negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of Curry's injuries. 
Therefore, no liability was 
found on Sharma's part. The 
panel ultimately concluded that 
since Sharma's negligence was 
not the proximate cause of Cur-
ry's injuries, no liability could 
be entered against Hillcrest and 
that the default order should be 
stricken. 
Curry then brought an 
action in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County to nullify 
HCAO's award, asserting that 
she was entitled to a default 
judgment against Hillcrest and 
an award of damages. The cir-
cuit court vacated the HCAO's 
award, noting that a defense 
established by anon-defaulting 
defendant inures to the benefit 
of a co-defendant in default only 
when the answering defense 
precludes the claimant's entire 
right of action, such as in a 
statute of limitations defense. 
However, the circuit court found 
in Hillcrest's favor at the trial 
on the merits as to its liability. 
Curry appealed the cir-
cuit court's findings to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Mary-
land, and Hillcrest cross-ap-
pealed the circuit court's deci-
sion to vacate HCAD's award. 
The court of special appeals, 
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while finding it unnecessary to 
address the issue of whether 
Sharma's defense inured to the 
benefit of Hillcrest, stated that 
the force of the Frow doctrine 
relied upon by the arbitration 
panel was "questionable" in 
Mary land. The court of appeals 
granted cross-petitions for cer-
tiorari to consider the status of 
this doctrine given the doubts 
cast upon its continuing validi-
ty by the intermediate appellate 
court. 
After establishing the le-
gitimacy of HCAO's action in 
setting aside the judgment of 
default against Hillcrest, the 
court discussed the merits of 
the Frow doctrine. The court, 
in discussing the historical un-
derpinnings of the doctrine, 
noted that the Frow doctrine 
was created out of a necessity to 
prevent judicial absurdity. Cur-
ry at 429, 653 A.2d. at 942. In 
cases like the present one, the 
court explained that if a defen-
dant in default did not inure to 
the benefit of a judgment in 
favor of a co-defendant, "there 
might be one decree of the 
court sustaining the charge ... 
committed by the defendants; 
and another decree disaffirming 
the [same] charge." ld. (quot-
ing Frow, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 
554). As with res judicata, the 
courts rely on the Frow doc-
trine to prevent a separate find-
ing on the same issue or claim 
from contradicting the original 
finding. 
The court of appeals 
rebutted the court of special 
appeal's uncertainty as to the 
status ofthe.doctrine by show-
ing that its acceptance in Mary-
land dates back over 150 years. 
The court cited Lingan v. 
Henderson, which stated that 
"where the defence made by 
one defendant goes to the whole 
cause of [the] complaint, and 
the plaintiff fails to establish 
his case in opposition to such 
defense, he cannot be relieved 
in anyway whatever, although 
his claim should be confessed 
by the other defendants." ld. at 
431, 653 A.2d at 943 (quoting 
Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland 
236, 261 (Md. Ct. Chanco 
1827)). The Lingan court went 
on to state that since "every 
Court of justice must act con-
sistently, [the court] cannot be 
allowed to contradict itself, by 
saying, in the same decree, in 
the same case, that the plaintiff 
has no cause of suit whatever; 
and also, that he has a just and 
well founded cause of com-
plaint." ld. at431-32, 653 A.2d 
at 944 (quoting Lingan v. 
Henderson, 1 Bland 236, 275 
(Md. Ct. Chanco 1827)). In 
summary, the court concluded 
that Maryland law has histori-
cally recognized and accepted 
the Frow doctrine. ld. at 433, 
653 A.2d at 944. 
Curry raised the issue, 
however, that the doctrine may 
not be applicable to modemju-
risprudence. To support this 
claim, Curry referred to and the 
court recognized a Georgia case 
, as having questioned the va-
lidity of the Frow doctrine. ld. 
at 433, 653 A.2d at 944. In 
Chenoweth Fred Chenoweth 
EquipmentCo. v. Ocu/usCorp., 
the Supreme Court of Georgia 
------------__ 25.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - &J.3l 
----~ ---- -- -
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held that the defendant should 
not be relieved of his default 
even if co-defendants go on to 
prevail on the merits. Id.at433, 
653 A.2d at 945 (citing Fred 
Chenoweth Equipment Co. v. 
Oculus Corp., 328 S.E.2d 539, 
541 (Ga. 1985». The court of 
appeals distinguished the Geor-
gia ruling by noting that 
Chenoweth relied on the 
premise that a default judgment 
is primarily a punitive measure 
which needed to be enforced. 
Id. at 434, 653 A.2d at 945. In 
contrast, Maryland law "does 
not weigh the balance so heavi-
ly against the truth seeking func-
tion of adversary litigation." Id. 
The court reasoned that al-
though Chenoweth cast some 
doubt upon the Frow doctrine, 
Georgia and Mary land stand on 
, , different footings as to their 
analysis of the significance of 
the doctrine. Id. Whereas Geor-
gia law gives a great amount of 
deference to enforcing default 
judgments, Maryland law pre-
fers a resolution to the matter 
on the merits. Since the Frow 
doctrine is premised upon con-
sistency of judgments on the 
merits, Maryland courts will 
logically give the doctrine more 
weight than Georgia courts. 
The court also noted a 
necessary requirement which 
must be met to satisfy the Frow 
doctrine -- that a finding of no 
liability on the part of a non-
defaulting co-defendant would 
necessarily preclude a finding 
of liability on the part of the co-
defendant in default. Id. at 430, 
653 A.2d at 943. The court 
reasoned that the doctrine "cer-
tainly operates where the con-
duct of the defendant who ap-
peared and successfully de-
fended on the merits is the sole 
basis for liability of a default-
ing defendant." Id. (emphasis 
added). In the instant case the 
court stressed that a finding of 
no liability on the part of 
Sharma would necessarily dic-
tate no liability on the part of 
Hillcrest under a respondeat 
superior claim. Id. at 435,653 
A.2d at 945. Therefore, it was 
clear to the court that the Frow 
doctrine is certainly in effect 
when a finding in favor of one 
defendant, in the interest of 
consistency, would necessari-
ly preclude an adverse finding 
as to any co-defendants. 
By legitimizing the 
Frow doctrine in light of mod-
ern legal analysis, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has ef-
fectively recreated significant 
common law. In an era of 
judicial activism and increased 
skepticism of many common 
law principles, the court found 
applicable a doctrine which, 
while incorporated into Mary-
land law over 150 years ago, 
has not gained much consider-
ation since then. In fact, the 
court did not reference one rel-
evant citation concerning the 
Frow doctrine from this centu-
ry. Further, in light of the 
modem Georgia ruling on the 
Frow doctrine in Chenoweth, 
the court of appeals exercised 
significant judicial restraint by 
deferring to the common law. 
The court's ruling is 
quite logical in that it not only 
avoids an absurd situation 
<". - :..; . . :;E::~._ .:.. / 2~.3 ________ . ____ _ 
where one defendant may be 
held liable even though the mer-
its of the claim were found his 
favor, but it also establishes a 
certain amount of judicia I econ-
omy. The court put an end to the 
continued disposition of a case 
where the merits of which had 
already been determined. Also, 
regarding the court's having dis-
tinguished Maryland law from 
the Georgia law relied upon in 
Chenoweth, it seems as though, 
at least in situations such as the 
one presented here, Maryland 
law will defer to findings on the 
substantive merits of a claim 
rather than getting bogged down 
in procedural niceties. By not 
allowing damages to be imposed 
upon Hillcrest, the court gave 
more weight to the determina-
tion on the merits than to ajudg-
ment of default. Accordingly, 
Curry v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc. 
indicates a possible movement 
of Maryland courts toward a 
preference for disposing of pro-
cedural arguments where the 
substantive merits of a claim are 
clearly apparent. 
- Paul J Cucuzzella 
